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The topic of my paper is the attack on cosmopolitanism ever since the Great Recession. 
Since 2008, populist reactions to the ill effects of globalisation have sprung up in many 
Western countries. Their target is the post-WW II political consensus—at least as far as 
Europe is concerned—of an ‘ever closer union,’ a policy based on 20th century history 
and a new cosmopolitan sensibility. This sensibility is now under attack—Brexit being 
only the most visible sign—and calls for a new nationalism have returned to both sides of 
the Atlantic. For a West-German citizen born after the war, such a focus on the nation 
was out of the question for all the well-known reasons. In this paper I engage with the 
critics of cosmopolitanism, exploring both populist and liberal objections to it. As a 
result, I arrive at a more nuanced position that takes stock of the negative effects of 
globalization. I suggest that the road forward—at least for the foreseeable future—might 
well be a division of labour between the European nation states and a cosmopolitan 
sensibility. 
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I would like to start with a quote from After Europe, Ivan Krastev’s 2017 
meditation on the future of the European Union. Krastev’s book is not a swan 
song to the European Union. Rather, he tries to find an explanation for the rising 
disenchantment with this institution as felt in many of its member states. In the 
process, he submits the following bifurcated observation on cosmopolitanism, 
which I will use to set the stage for my reflections on the challenge that today’s 
populist movements pose to my own cosmopolitan beliefs. The bifurcation 
alludes to the different ways Western and Central Europeans conceive of 
transnational, or cosmopolitan, ideas. Krastev suggests that: 
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the German drive for cosmopolitanism was […] a way to escape the 
xenophobic legacy of Nazism, while it could be argued that Central 
Europe’s anti-cosmopolitanism is partially rooted in an aversion to a 
communist imposed internationalism […] (In Western Europe, 1968 
symbolizes the endorsement of cosmopolitan values, while in the East it 
stands for the rebirth of national sentiments). (Krastev, 2017, p. 57) 
What I find so instructive about this statement is that the move towards 
internationalism or cosmopolitanism—is either welcomed or rejected on the basis 
of a nation’s history. Not only do these diametrically opposed reactions to a 
post- national Europe help explain the gap in the European handling of refugees 
in Western and Central Europe (Merkel: thumbs up; Orban: thumbs down); they 
point, in addition, to the cultural and political roots for these divergent policies. 
Krastev’s remark thus provides a first indication that the populist challenge to 
cosmopolitanism needs to be taken seriously rather than to be rejected out of 
hand as undemocratic intervention. In what follows I will pass in review recent 
challenges to the view that cosmopolitanism represents the arrow of history. I 
will use the term cosmopolitanism in the way Krastev understands it: namely, as 
the underlying drive of a European post-World War II vision to build a united 
Europe, an ‘ever closer union,’ in which, ideally, and eventually, national 
sovereignty gets dissolved in European sovereignty. 
In no country, perhaps, was this drive for a European unification stronger than in 
West Germany. The burden of the Nazi crimes committed in the name and with 
the support of the German people, prohibited, after 1945, a patriotic focus on 
the nation. In the West Germany I grew up in, not all, to be sure, but a large 
majority of politicians and citizens rejected expressions of nationalist sentiment 
in any shape or form. In its stead, they espoused a European cosmopolitanism 
or, at the very least, multilateralism. Led by the vision of a united Europe that 
would see no more wars, cosmopolitan-minded Germans, even after the fall of 
the Wall, were Europeans long before they received European passports. Looking 
back from today’s vantage, the decision in favor of cosmopolitanism as a 
bulwark against nationalism was a very successful undertaking. 
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What we are learning the hard way today, however, is that, along with 
nationalism, cosmopolitans rejected the nation state in general. Not in reality, of 
course, but potentially. For, as is quite plain to see, not only do the European 
nation states still exist but they also wield political power commensurate with 
their economic strength. In other words, nation states continue to exist 
alongside the cosmopolitan project of the European Union. Yet, in theory, the 
goal of a truly cosmopolitan vision is to step by step merge these nation states 
into one sovereign European state—whose citizens would eventually agree with 
Emmanuel Macron’s exclamation “Brussels is us”—made during his Initiative for 
Europe speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017. Today’s populist 
movements, however, most ardently the supporters of Brexit, are opposed 
precisely to this endgame of cosmopolitanism. 
As a German, born in 1955, it was “natural” to be a defender of cosmopolitanism 
and of European integration. But given the recent populist attacks on 
cosmopolitan elites as well as the claim of a democratic deficit in the governance 
of the EU, I feel the need to re- examine my own premises. In a first step, I will 
pass in review the  political objections that recent populist movements have 
leveled against Europe’s cosmopolitan aspirations. In a second step, I will 
interrogate the theoretical arguments leveled against cosmopolitan democracy 
even by some defenders of cosmopolitanism. I will then suggest that a re- 
conceptualized cosmopolitanism is nevertheless indispensable for European 
integration and a peaceful world. 
 
I. The Populist Challenge 
Populism itself is not an ideology, if by ideology we mean to designate a 
particular set of beliefs as they are for example enshrined in religious doctrines 
or party platforms. Populists, rather, in the words of Ernesto Laclau, ‘construct a 
political frontier dividing society into two camps and calling for the mobilization 
of the “underdog” against “those in power”’ (quoted in Mouffe, 2018, pp. 10-11). 
Populists therefore display an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ mentality, with ‘us’ being the 
people, while ‘them’ refers to a perceived elite. This formalist conception of 
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populism does not exclude that, at any particular point in history, a populist 
revolt has a precise political content, purpose, or agenda when it erupts. All we 
need to do is look to Brexit for confirmation. But because the populist moment 
has no core set of beliefs, is not attached to any party platform, the revolt of the 
underdogs or ‘left-behinds’ (Goodhart, 2017) is more easily co-opted, even high-
jacked, by demagogues who fill the populist outrage with anti- liberal and anti-
democratic content. 
In the recent literature on populism, if we zoom out far enough, we can discern 
two schools of thought when it comes to the legitimacy of populism as a 
democratic tool. For some, populism is seen as a political means to protest an 
elite’s neglect of their vital interests: Goodhart (2017), Judis (2016), Koppetsch 
(2019), Manow (2018), and Mouffe (2019) are in this camp. For others, 
however, populism poses a direct danger to liberal democracy because of its 
anti-pluralist stance: see Galston (2018), Krastev (2017), Mudde (2017), and 
Müller (2016). 
For the first group, populism emerges as a legitimate political reaction to real 
existing inequalities that are not on the radar of ruling elites. Populism here 
represents the pressure from below without which important changes to the 
political landscape will never happen. It is therefore seen as a democratic 
counter weight. If handled without giving in to authoritarian, nationalist, or 
nativist seduction, such a form of democratic populism could even be helpful in 
stabilizing the political system. The field of those who see populism as a 
legitimate activity includes defenders of national populism (Eatwell and Goodwin, 
2019) as well as leftist populism (Mouffe, 2018). Both camps see populist 
interventions as the honest expression of a disadvantaged section of the 
population voicing legitimate complaints against an elite, while staying within the 
bounds of liberal democracy. 
The second school of thought considers populism an undemocratic, and therefore 
illegitimate, tool of political change—in spite of the fact that its representatives 
also recognize the validity of the populist complaints against the elites. However, 
they consider the populists’ political demands as but a smokescreen. For them, 
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populist rhetoric is anti-pluralist in orientation and the real danger comes to light 
once populists are in power (as in Central European countries today), for then 
they start to erode liberal institutions. This is because populists assume their 
voice is the authentic voice of the people, which makes all other political 
positions not just different but inauthentic. Their authenticity, they argue, gives 
them the right to curtail or abolish fundamental institutions of liberal democracy, 
such as the state of law (Rechtsstaat), the division of powers, and the freedom 
of the press. In the words of Ivan Krastev: 
What characterizes populists in power are their constant attempts to 
dismantle the system of checks and balances and to bring independent 
institutions like courts, central banks, media outlets, and civil society 
organizations under their control. 
Populists and radical parties aren’t just parties; they are constitutional 
movements. They promise voters what liberal democracy cannot: a sense 
of victory where majorities—not just political majorities, but ethnic and 
religious ones, too—can do what they please. 
The rise of these parties is symptomatic of the explosion of threatened 
majorities as a force in European politics. They blame the loss of control 
over their lives, real or imagined, on a conspiracy between cosmopolitan-
minded elites and tribal-minded immigrants. They blame liberal ideas and 
institutions for weakening the national will and eroding national unity. 
They tend to see compromise as corruption and zealousness as conviction. 
(Krastev, 2017, pp. 75-6) 
Thus, while both schools of thought agree that the populist revolt stems from 
opposition to elites, it is the second for whom the true nature of populism 
surfaces in the anti-democratic slippage that occurs when legitimate complaints 
of a loss in political solidarity take the form of anti- liberal, authoritarian politics. 
For the danger is that, for the loss of solidarity to be regained, populists often 
make use of ethnic or religious nationalism. 
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Thus, while populism of the first kind looks to establish political solidarity in 
democratic fashion, the second—potentially—conceives solidarity on the pre-
political level of the nation as ethnic or religious community where, at least 
potentially, non-national others may be persecuted. John B. Judis (2016) refers 
to the first kind of populism as dyadic (people/elite) and to the second as a 
triadic (people/elite/other to blame]. This debate about the true nature of 
populism is in full swing and both sides have serious arguments on their side. 
What is interesting for my purposes is that, in both cases, whether as animus 
against the reigning elite or as threat to the institutions of pluralist democracy, 
cosmopolitanism finds itself in populism’s line of fire. This is so because 
cosmopolitans are seen as lacking, even as challenging the kind of solidarity 
populists want to reclaim. 
 
II. Cosmopolitanism, Globalization, and the Problem of Solidarity 
In order to see if this assessment of cosmopolitanism is justified, we need to dig 
deeper. Since the mid-1990s, a great number of books and essay collections on 
cosmopolitanism have appeared, among them Archibugi (2003), Brock and 
Brighouse (2005), Brown and Held (2010), Breckenridge (2002), Cheah and 
Robbins (1998), Robbins and Lemon Horta (2017), and Vertovec and Cohen 
(2002). These different collections interrogate cosmopolitanism from all points of 
view: systematic, historical, philosophical, ethical, political, sociological, and 
Eurocentric. 
One of the reasons for this busy publishing activity is the challenge to which the 
idea of cosmopolitanism has been put in the wake of what Dani Rodrik (2019) 
has called hyper-globalization—an economic trend which itself is the result of 
drastically changed political circumstances since the early 1990s. After the fall of 
communism, the economic and political alternatives to Western-style liberalism 
and capitalism seemed exhausted. Some even suggested that History, 
understood as the sequence of economic and political formations, had come to 
an end. Buoyed by this sentiment, laissez-faire capitalism and neoliberalism 
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underwrote the liberalization of world markets including the free flow of people, 
products, and capital across international borders. 
As it turns out, hyper-globalization while it contributed to economic growth 
during the last 25 years, has also brought about immense inequalities. The 
reason for the failure of hyper-globalization, as Rodrik sees it, is two-fold: a first 
failure consists in the fact that since trade will produce comparative advantages 
for some and disadvantages for others, the international community should have 
taken care of the losers of the liberalization of markets. That did not happen. 
Rather, a broad section of the middle classes in the US and Europe were left 
behind; blaming the elites for their fate, they have lost all trust in the system. A 
second failure of hyper-globalization is to be seen in the fact that multi-national 
companies and international organization were allowed to dictate rules and 
regulations across international borders that clashed with deeply held values 
about regulatory diversity or national autonomy. For Rodrik, the trouble started 
when hyper-globalization, rather than serving the broad economic interests of 
the world community, came to be seen as an end in itself. 
The flow of people across borders—this is where cosmopolitanism comes in. For 
the globalization of trade included the rise of a new class of professionals and 
technocrats without national roots, whose values, interests, connections, and 
identification are not with their immediate environment, but rather with 
“rootless” people like themselves, be they in faraway places or in the 
neighborhood. David Goodhart (2017) who researched this phenomenon in the 
case of Brexit, labeled this new class the Anywheres. What unites them is that 
their values and identifications are not rooted in the nation. On the contrary, 
they pride themselves on having a broader view because they are no longer 
attached to a national community. They are the new cosmopolitans, the winners 
of globalization, who are affluent, able to move to a different place when times 
get hard. The Somewheres on the other hand, are the locals, those who cannot 
and do not want to leave their local attachments. Many of them have been losers 
of globalization who feel that their livelihood, their traditions, their country, and 
their nation is in danger of being transformed by policies and ideologies designed 
by a far-off European Union for the benefit of the rootless Anywheres. In 
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Goodhart’s view this is the reason why the Somewheres voted to leave the 
European Union. Thus, the effects of globalization are here identified as the 
culprit that fueled the populist explosion leading to a nationalist backlash in 
England as well as in other liberal democracies. 
This is the first point I concede to the populist challenge. I find it hard not to 
agree with this critique of an economic cosmopolitanism that as a result of 
hyper-globalization has led to economic hardship for those who cannot compete 
with the new cosmopolitan realities. I am convinced that globalization 
contributed to this state of affairs, and the lack of national and EU attention to 
the fate of certain segments of British society has led to a loss of a sense of 
solidarity that gets expressed in populist anger. 
Yet the critique of cosmopolitanism does not only come from the populists. A 
similar critique of cosmopolitan democracy comes from the discipline of political 
sociology that, on a more theoretical level, shares some of populism’s principal 
complaints. I am thinking in particular of the work of Craig Calhoun. As it turns 
out, the crux here, as in populism is the notion of solidarity. 
 
III. Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and the Nation State 
“Nationalism is not a moral mistake” (Calhoun, 2007, p. 1). This first sentence of 
Craig Calhoun’s collection of essays published in 2007 under the title Nations 
Matter really hit me when I first read it. It hit me because—as a proponent of 
cosmopolitanism—this is precisely how I thought about nationalism—as a moral 
mistake. Since this is the first sentence of the book, I assume I was not the only 
one to think so. 
The sentence is worth repeating along with the paragraph that follows: 
Nationalism is not a moral mistake. Certainly it is too often implicated in 
atrocities, and in more banal but still unjust prejudices and discriminatory 
practices. It too often makes people think arbitrary boundaries are natural 
and contemporary global divisions ancient and inevitable. But it is also a 
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form of social solidarity and one of the background conditions on which 
modern democracy has been based. It has helped secure domestic 
inclusion and redistributive policies even while it has inhibited 
cosmopolitan attention to the needs of non-nationals. Nationalism helps 
locate an experience of belonging in a world of global flows and fears. 
Sometimes it underwrites struggle against the fantastically unequal and 
exploitative terms on which global integration is being achieved. 
We should approach nationalism with critical attention to its limits, 
illusions, and potential for abuse, but we should not dismiss it. Even 
where we are deeply critical of the nationalism we see, we should 
recognize the continued importance of national solidarities. Even if we 
wish for a more cosmopolitan world order, we should be realistic enough 
not to act on mere wishes. (Calhoun, 2017, p. 1) 
After much soul searching, and in spite of my personal convictions, I tend to 
agree with Calhoun that abstract cosmopolitanism, as in the case of my “natural” 
support for the EU, has a hard time providing a sense of belonging as long as 
national populations in its member states do not feel that their interests are 
represented. As long as that is the case, they will—rightly—fall back on the 
national solidarities they are used to and feel supported by. 
I am also in agreement with Calhoun’s point that national solidarities are 
providing the background conditions for liberal democracy to function. His main 
point is that, historically speaking, democracy does best when it is linked to a 
nation state that provides the framework for the growth of social solidarity as 
well as a sense of belonging. Through shared tradition, religion, and culture, the 
nation guarantees and fosters meaningful identifications. Here laws are created 
and enacted, policies are made, and the balance between the free market and 
the welfare state is worked out. As John B. Judis remarks in The Nationalist 
Revival: ‘Democracy needs a “We.”’ People make sacrifices (e.g., pay taxes, go 
to war) only if they identify with the community that demands them. That is to 
say, people act this way only if they feel they have a voice in the community; 
hence the link between democracy and nationalism. 
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These are two additional points I concede to the critics of cosmopolitan 
democracy and actually existing cosmopolitanism. Yet, despite my general 
agreement with Calhoun’s remarks, I feel uneasy when it comes to his broad 
support for nationalism. For me to agree more wholeheartedly with him, 
nationalism has to be qualified as liberal and distinguished from illiberal 
nationalism. I therefore much prefer to speak of allegiance to the nation state 
rather than of nationalism. For not all nationalisms are the same, and it makes a 
huge difference whether or not the nation state is defended on the basis of 
liberal ideals or on a brand of ethnic, nativist, or otherwise exclusionary forms of 
nationalism. To me, it makes all the difference on what the sense of belonging is 
based. 
It is for this reason that I am following Harvard historian and New Yorker staff 
writer Jill Lepore, rather than Calhoun, when it comes to a sense of national 
belonging. In 2019, in a series of shorter pieces on the nature of American 
nationalism in Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, and a small book entitled 
This America: The Case for the Nation, Lepore (2019 a,b,c,) puts forward an 
interpretation of American nationalism that entertains a close relationship to a 
liberal sense of belonging. In these texts, she reminds her readers that the first 
nationalists in the US called themselves federalists, that is to say, their 
nationalism found expression in the political confederation of states that led to 
the writing of a constitution. US national sentiment therefore co-originates with 
the founding of the state. Because the political union, the state, is at the basis of 
American nationalism, Lepore calls the United States a state-nation rather than a 
nation-state. 
What this means in the context of my argument here is that the sense of 
belonging to this new nation was based on a liberal creed rather than a pre-
political national sentiment. (John B. Judis [2018], by the way, holds the 
opposite view, namely, that American nationalism stems from the ethno-
religious community of Anglo-American Protestantism.) In order to counter the 
resurgence of illiberal versions of American nationalism today, Lepore exhorts 
her fellow historians to retell the history of American nationalism as the contest 
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between liberal and illiberal forces and to side with the liberal national sentiment 
as it was articulated by Frederick Douglass and W.E. B. Du Bois, among others. 
What Lepore describes as American nationalism here, post-WWII German 
thinkers labeled constitutional patriotism—an allegiance to a liberal creed with 
cosmopolitan dimensions. The hope was that the European Union could be 
founded on such a creed as well, turning into what Lepore calls a “state-nation,” 
and that the idea of constitutional patriotism could function as a blueprint for 
European cosmopolitan democracy. But as we know the proposed European 
constitution was not ratified by all member states and was subsequently 
transformed into the Lisbon Treaty—dealing a crushing blow to the hopes for a 
cosmopolitan democracy. Furthermore, today’s populisms, as shown above, 
allege an essential disconnect between cosmopolitanism and democracy. Some 
of this development is to blame on the confusion that because of its underlying 
universalism (love of humanity rather than nation) cosmopolitans see their 
ideals as superior to national sentiments and can therefore introduce their ideas 
by fiat. But as Calhoun rightly states with respect to actually existing 
cosmopolitanism: ‘cosmopolitanism is not universalism; it is easiest for those 
who belong to a social class able to identify itself with the universal’ (Calhoun 
2012, pp. 106-07). The mistake of real existing cosmopolitanism was to assume 
that it represents a superior loyalty rather than a different one. 
Real existing cosmopolitanism merely targets a larger, transnational, audience 
as opposed to a local, regional, or traditional one, and the solidarities it offers 
are largely based on interactional and rational, rather than cultural, ethnic, or 
religious grounds. My personal preferences lie with this ‘larger loyalty’ (Rorty, 
1998) offered by cosmopolitanism. I feel closer to people who have moved 
beyond their local communities and inherited cultures, who embrace a broader 
outlook. But I have learned that cosmopolitan democracy is a particular political 
stance, not a superior one, and like any other political position, in order to 
become implemented, it needs to find a majority. 
And it is here that, for example, EU cosmopolitanism runs into trouble with its 
democratic deficit. Unless and until the EU convinces the populations of its 
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member states of the benefits of an ever-closer union, cosmopolitan democracy 
will not be attractive. Because of the democratic deficit, the question has 
resurfaced as to whether or not the long-term cosmopolitan goal of the 
overcoming of nation states is the best way to go. Calhoun and most of the 
critics assessing the rise of populism maintain that for theoretical and practical 
reasons it would be a mistake to try to overcome the nation state and national 
attachments at this point in history. 
Having passed the arguments against cosmopolitan democracy in review, I 
conclude by agreeing with Calhoun when he says: ‘Cosmopolitanism – like NGOs 
and civil society—makes much more sense as a complement to states, and 
sometimes a corrective to state politics, than as an alternative to them’ (Calhoun 
2012, p. 117). I am therefore, at least for now, left with cosmopolitanism as 
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